Constitutional Law: \u3ci\u3eUnited States v. Viefhaus\u3c/i\u3e and the Demise of the Libertarian Philosophy in Free Speech Jurisprudence by Wade, Stephanie D.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 54 Number 2 
1-1-2001 
Constitutional Law: United States v. Viefhaus and the Demise of 
the Libertarian Philosophy in Free Speech Jurisprudence 
Stephanie D. Wade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie D. Wade, Constitutional Law: United States v. Viefhaus and the Demise of the Libertarian 
Philosophy in Free Speech Jurisprudence, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 397 (2001), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
Constitutional Law: United States v. Vie]haus and the
Demise of the Libertarian Philosophy in Free Speech
Jurisprudence
Only by a dedicated preservation of the freedom of the First Amendment
can we hope to preserve our Nation and its traditional way of life.'
- Hugo Black
Supreme Court Justice, 1937-1971
L Introduction
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit handed down a decision
on February 16, 1999, that further muddled the line between "pure speech," which
is protected by the First Amendment, and "threatening speech," which falls outside
First Amendment protection. In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Briscoe, the
three-judge panel confirmed the conviction of white supremacist James Viefhaus,
Jr.2 In July 1997, a jury convicted Viefhaus on three counts: (1) use of a telephone
to make a bomb threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e); (2) conspiracy to use a
telephone to make a bomb threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (3)
possession of an unregistered explosive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d).' The trial gained much publicity in the Oklahoma and national press,
primarily because Viefhaus's codefendant, Carol Howe, became a key defense
witness in the trial of Terry Nichols for the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
building in Oklahoma City.
Viefhaus's conviction rested on an answering machine message recorded by
Viefhaus in which he related a threat, made by a third party, to bomb fifteen cities.'
Viefhaus did not appeal his conviction for possession of an explosive device.6
Instead, he appealed the conviction for using a telephone to make a bomb threat,
claiming the prosecution of such a charge violated the First Amendment.7 Citing
Watts v. United States,' Viefhaus claimed the government could not constitutionally
prosecute him for his words because they did not convey a true threat.'
I. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 444 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (1999).
3. Id. at 395.
4. David Harper, Viefhaus Shunned by High Court, TULSA WORLD, July 1, 1999, at 14, available
at 1999 WL 5405471.
5. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 395.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellant at 9, Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-5207).
8. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
9. Brief for Appellant at 12, Viefhaus (No. 97-5207).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The Tenth Circuit's decision in this case represents one of many decisions over
the last three decades that has eroded the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation
of the First Amendment developed during the Warren era. The Warren Court
exemplified the libertarian trend in free speech jurisprudence, which is now on the
decline.' In the Warren era, the Supreme Court handed down landmark First
Amendment cases such as Brandenburg v. Ohio," Watts v. United States,'2 Noto
v. United States,3 and Scales v. United States.'4 In each of these cases, the Court
attempted to draw a clearer line between speech that the government has a
legitimate interest in prohibiting and speech that is beyond the reach of government
because of First Amendment protection. This line of cases greatly expanded the
scope of First Amendment protection by disallowing the criminal prosecution of
pure speech, unless that speech is "brigaded" with action. 5
The Tenth Circuit, however, has curtailed the breadth of First Amendment
protection with decisions like Viefhaus. 6 This note argues that the Tenth Circuit's
decision in VieJhaus is incongruous with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment. First, this note addresses the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the First Amendment as it relates to threats. Second, it presents the relevant
decisions of the various circuits regarding threatening speech. Third, the note
analyzes the decision handed down in Viefhaus. Finally, the note presents an
approach to "threatening speech" cases that more closely conforms with the
expansive interpretation given to the First Amendment by the Supreme Court.
II. The Supreme Court and Threatening Speech
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech. .. ." Despite the absolute language of this amendment, the
Supreme Court has never interpreted this language to prohibit all laws restricting
speech. Instead, the Court has carved out narrow exceptions that allow govern-
ments, in limited situations, to legitimately proscribe speech,' reasoning that the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from breaches of the
peace 9 and imminent lawless action and violence.'
10. 2 ALFRED H. KELLY Er AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTrTUTON: ITS ORIGINS AND DEvELOPMENT
612-38 (7th ed. 1991).
11. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
13. 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
14. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Waits, 394 U.S. at 708.
16. 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (upholding a state's right to ban certain
obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (allowing proscription of speech that incites
imminent lawless action); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that "fighting
words" are beyond the protection of the Fiast Amendment).
19. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
20. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447
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The Court has directly addressed the issue of whether the First Amendment
protects the maker of violent threats in only two cases. The first of these cases was
Watts, decided in 1969. During the height of Vietnam War unrest, eighteen-year-old
Robert Watts spoke in opposition to the war at a political rally at the Washington
Monument."' Watts claimed that he would never go to Vietnam and that if anyone
made him carry a rifle, the first man he would "want to get in his sights [would be]
L.BJ." The lower court convicted Watts of threatening to take the life of the
President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).' The Supreme Court reversed this
conviction, holding that the First Amendment protected Watts's speech in this
situation.' The Court reasoned that Watts's speech was not a "true threat" but was
merely political hyperbole within the protection of the Constitution.'
This short, per curiam opinion did little to enlighten future courts as to what
exactly constitutes a "true threat." The Court suggested three factors that determine
whether language conveys a punishable threat: (1) the context in which the speech
is made; (2) whether the statement is conditional; and (3) the reaction of the
listeners.' The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of speech, even
when that speech is crude, offensive, caustic, vituperative, and abusive.27 Offering
only this limited guidance, the Court left later courts to develop the "true threat"
doctrine.
The Court revisited threatening speech in the civil context in 1982 in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co.' In this case, Mississippi merchants brought suit against
Charles Evers and the NAACP for damages resulting from a civil rights boycott of
their businesses.' Among other allegations, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants used threats and intimidation to keep African Americans from violating
the boycott" The trial court concluded that Evers threatened to "discipline"
boycott violators and "break [their] damn neck[s]" if they violated the boycott."
(The court also found that such acts of violence actually occurred.') Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected this speech, and that
the State could not impose civil liability for damages flowing from such threats.3
The Court reasoned that to be effective, an advocate "must be free to stimulate his
audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common
21. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969).
22. Id.
23. Title 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) provides in pertinent part, "Whoever knowingly and willfully ...
makes any threat against the President ... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
24. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
29. Id. at 886.
30. 1I.
31. Id. at 902.
32. Id. at 904-07.
33. Id. at 918.
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cause."' Additionally, the Court suggested that it could impose liability only if the
threats had actually been carried out?' The Court concluded that the merchants
presented no evidence, apart from the speeches themselves, that Evers actually
authorized any violence.' Therefore, Evers could not be held liable for damages
to the businesses."
The Claiborne Court relied most heavily on the incitement cases, Brandenburg
and Noto, rather than on the "true threat" doctrine in Watts.3 Nevertheless, the
decision in Claiborne reaffirmed the Court's interest in extending the scope of the
First Amendment rather than restricting it. Claiborne specifically indicates that even
when the right of free speech conflicts with the right to be free from fear of bodily
injury, the right to free speech will prevail." Interestingly, none of the circuits
have cited Claiborne in cases involving threatening speech. Because the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari to all other cases addressing threatening speech, circuit
courts have been allowed to develop the threatening speech doctrine in a different
manner than the Supreme Court dictated in Claiborne.
I1. "True Threats" and the Circuit Courts of Appeals
Each circuit has had an opportunity to address the issue of the permissibility of
prosecution of threatening speech. This section, however, will discuss only a
representative few. The Second Circuit addressed the issue in 1976 in United States
v. Kelner.6 In that case, the government prosecuted the defendant, a spokesman
for the Jewish Defense League,4' under a general federal anti-threat statute.'2
When Yasser Arafat visited New York, the defendant gave a television interview
in which he stated that his men had planned in detail Arafat's assassination and
intended to make sure Arafat did not leave the country alive.!3 During the
interview, Kelner wore military fatigues, brandished a revolver, and guaranteed that
his assassination plot would succeed." The defendant appealed his conviction,
claiming that he did not communicate any threat to Arafat and that the statements
made were not threats, but were mere political hyperbole protected by the First
Amendment."s
34. Id. at 928.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 929.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 927-29.
39. Id. at 927-28.
40. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 1020.
42. Kelner was convicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which prohibited threats transmitted in
interstate commerce to kidnap or injure another person. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020.
43. Id. at 1021.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1022.
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The court held that the anti-threat statute required only intent to communicate the
threat to the victim, not specific intent or present ability to carry out the threat."
Addressing the constitutional argument, the Second Circuit adopted Watts and held
that the threat must be conveyed with a gravity of purpose and likelihood of
execution to remove it from constitutional protection.47 In upholding the convic-
tion, the court reasoned that the defendant made unequivocal and unconditional
threats against Arafat's life." Threats of this nature, the Court reasoned, are so
interlocked with violent conduct that they are beyond the pale of constitutional
protection.!9
The analysis in Kelner holds true to Watts by affirming that only "true threats"
may be punished. The court engaged in a lengthy consideration of the impact such
application would have on the First Amendment and fashioned a narrow rule to
accommodate the strong national commitment to unencumbered expression. Other
circuits, however, have not as carefully considered the impact of their decisions on
freedom of speech.
In Shackleford v. Shirley,"' the Fifth Circuit denied habeas relief to a man
convicted under a Mississippi harassment statute." The defendant phoned his
former supervisor and said that the next time the supervisor came by defendant's car
lot, he would be "toting an ass-whipping." 2 The defendant appealed, arguing that
his speech could not be punished within the bounds of the Constitution. 3 The court
approvingly cited Kelner and Watts, holding that threats are only punishable when
unambiguous and made with such immediacy that they convincingly express an
intent of being carried out.' However, the court insisted that Watts only extended
to political speech and public dialogue.5 As Shackleford's speech fell outside the
realm of political speech, his statement did not receive First Amendment protec-
tion.'
While the Supreme Court may not have intended to protect this type of threat
when drafting the Watts opinion, the Court clearly expressed its belief that the First
Amendment protected such language in Claiborne.7 Unfortunately, the Shackleford
opinion does not address the principles pronounced in Claiborne. Unlike the Second
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit chose to read Watts as speech limiting, rather than
appropriately recognizing Watts as a radical leap in the area of free speech.'
46. Id. at 1023.
47. Id. at 1026.
48. Id. at 1027.
49. Id.
50. 948 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1991).
51. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-45 (1972) (providing in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for any
person or persons ... to make a telephone call, with intent to terrify, intimidate, or harass, and threaten
to inflict injury or physical harm to any person at the called number or to his property.").
52. Shackleford, 948 F.2d at 937.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 939.
55. Id at 938.
56. Id. at 938-39.
57. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
58. Before Wattu, people were convicted under the presidential-threat statute for such innocuous
2001]
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Most recently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an indictment against
a college student for threatening to rape a fellow student. In United States v.
Alkhabaz," the defendant sent e-mails to a friend, describing his desire to violently
sexually abuse a female classmate." The District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan dismissed the indictment, holding that the threats contained in the e-mail
did not constitute "true threats" under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).' The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, finding a threat punishable only when the threat conveys an intent to
injure for the purpose of furthering a goal through intimidation.' While the court
claimed it did not need to reach the First Amendment issue," First Amendment
concerns clearly drove the court's narrow interpretation of the anti-threat statute."
This construction of the statute provides a high degree of speech protection, in line
with Watts and Kelner.
The Tenth Circuit has given considerably less protection to free speech. The
precedents on which the Tenth Circuit relied to uphold Viefhaus's conviction are
inconsistent with the commands of the First Amendment as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Watts and Claiborne. In 1984 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
conviction of a psychiatric patient who threatened the life of President Reagan.'
In Welch v. United States, the defendant, while under care at a mental hospital,
stated that if Reagan were in town he would get a rifle, shoot him, and would 'do
a better job than Hinckley [had done]."'" When later questioned about these
statements by the Secret Service, the defendant reiterated the threats.' Notably, the
defendant was on medication for his mental condition at the time of the
statements." On appeal, the defendant claimed that because he made the statements
in order to express his dislike of Reagan's budget cuts, his conviction violated the
First Amendment.' In rejecting the appellant's argument, the court seized upon the
"political context" argument of Watts."0 The court interpreted Watts to apply only
to political discussions and rallies." Additionally, the court adopted a test whereby
statements as, "Wilson is a wooden-headed son of a bitch. I wish Wilson was in hell," Clark v. United
States, 250 F. 449 (5th Cir. 1918), and holding a sign saying "Hang Roosevelt," United States v. Apel,
44 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Il1. 1942).
59. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 1497-1501.
61. Id. at 1493.
62. Id. at 1495.
63. Id. at 1493.
64. The court cited Kelner approvingly, and favorably read the lower court opinion, reported at 890
F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), which rested its dismissal on First Amendment grounds. Alkhabaz,
104 F.3d at 1495.
65. Welch v. United States, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 615-16.
67. Id. at 616.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 618.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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a threat is considered punishable if a reasonable person would consider it a serious
expression to injure.'
The court cited as support for this "reasonable person" standard the concurrence
of Justice Marshall in Rogers v. United States, another presidential-threat case.'
In Rogers, the Court disposed of the case on nonconstitutional grounds 4 Justice
Marshall, concurring, addressed the First Amendment issue and specifically
expressed the impropriety of this objective "reasonable person" standard."' Despite
the Supreme Court's apparent disapproval, the Tenth Circuit adopted the reasonable
person standard that Justice Marshall concluded would have "substantial costs in
discouraging the uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate that the First Amend-
ment is intended to protect."'
Even more problematic to free speech values is the Tenth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Crews.' In Crews, another psychiatric patient threatened President
Reagan." While residing as a patient in the psychiatric wing of a veterans'
hospital, the defendant watched a program on nuclear war and the ramifications of
America's nuclear policy." The defendant became agitated over the program,
requested sedatives, and claimed that "'[i]f Reagan came to Sheridan [, Wyoming],
[he] would shoot him."'" When Secret Service agents later interviewed him, the
defendant denied making the threat, but stated that it "would be in the best interest
of this nation if that red-necked, bigoted, war-mongering, mother fucker were
shot."" The defendant appealed his conviction, asserting, inter alia, that his
statement was protected speech under the First Amendment.' The Tenth Circuit,
in a mere two paragraphs, rejected this argument, asserting that the question of
whether the speech was political was a question for the jury.' The court cited
Kelner but did not proceed with the analysis required by Kelner to determine
whether that speech was punishable." Kelner concedes that the issue of whether
a threat is a "true threat" is ultimately a question for the jury, but Kelner requires
the court to address the constitutional issue as a threshold question." Ultimately,
the court stood on its opinion in Welch and refused to overturn the conviction."
72. Id. at 619-20.
73. 422 U.S. 35 (1975).
74. Id. at 36.
75. Id. at 48 ("To permit the jury to convict on no more than a showing that a reasonably prudent
man would expect his hearers to take his threat seriously is to impose an unduly stringent standard in
this sensitive area.").
76. Id.
77. 781 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1986).
78. Id. at 829.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 830.
82. Id. at 831.
83. Id. at 832.
84. Id.; see also supra notes 36-38, 48-51 and accompanying text.
85. See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1976).
86. Crews, 781 F.2d at 832.
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These two decisions of the Tenth Circuit effectively gut Watts and the speech-
protective philosophy behind Watts. The Tenth Circuit justifies the two decisions
by reasoning solely that the government has a compelling interest in protecting the
President.' Yet, this interest also existed in Watts. The Supreme Court believed,
however, that when interpreting a statute that punishes pure speech, it "must be
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind."u
IV. United States v. Viefhaus
A. Facts
Against this backdrop, James Viefhaus never had a chance at reversal in the
Tenth Circuit. On December 8, 1996, Spokane, Washington journalist William
Morlin dialed the "hotline" number of the Aryan Intelligence Network. This hotline
served as the propaganda dissemination site for the two-member National Socialist
Alliance of Oklahoma.' During this call, Morlin heard a message recorded by
James Viefhaus. This message resulted in Viefhaus's conviction.
The message ran approximately five minutes and began by welcoming callers to
the "voice of the white revolution," offering bumper stickers for sale, and giving
callers addresses and phone numbers where they could obtain additional information
on the white-pride movement.'" The message continued with a long political
diatribe about the need to fight to preserve the white racial culture by creating a
separate Aryan nation.9 Viefhaus's speech ended with a call for action:
It is time for all white people to realize that the current system of
government is beyond repair. Our revolution is not about fixing this
system, but to absolutely destroy it, by any means necessary. Only then
can we build an Aryan society for our children and grandchildren. The
first major step in solidifying the revolutionary mentality is to under-
stand that there are only two classes in life, those who support our
cause and the enemy. As in the case of the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building, the revolutionary understands and accepts no matter
how painful that innocent people must be considered expendable if
necessary, in order to successfully complete any action. The
revolutionary must be ruthless, so motivated, dedicated, and intelligent
enough to operate as a chameleon in this occupied country, creative in
target selection, mature, and capable of exceptional judgment. This is
a warning to the white race. ZOG [Zionist Occupied Government] is
never going to accept or even acknowledge our request, request for
87. Id.
88. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
89. Viefhaus and his fiancie, Carol Howe, were the only members of the National Socialist Alliance
of Oklahoma.
90. Brief for Appellant at 3, Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-
5207).
91. Id. at 3-5.
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separation, therefore we are left with no choice but to take this country
back. This is war... racial ... holy war. As an added ultimatum to
those of you who are still unwilling to pick up a sword, a letter from a
high ranking revolutionary commander has been written and received
demanding that action be taken against the government by all white
warriors by December 15th and if this action is not taken, bombs will
be activated in 15 pre-selected major U.S. cities. That means December
15, 1996, one week from today. In another words, [sic] this war is
going to start with or without you. For all of you out there that have
been bragging about being ready and willing to jump in when the time
comes, well you better lace up your jump boots. Hail victory and never
forget we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white
children. Hail the order and please leave your comments after the
tone.'
After hearing this message, Morlin informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which subsequently searched Viefhaus's apartment. 3 During the search, the agents
recovered other tape recordings, racist literature, and various chemicals that the
government concluded could be turned into a pipe bomb. ' From these findings,
the government indicted Viefhaus and his girlfriend for conspiracy, possession of
an unregistered explosive device, and use of a telephone to make a bomb threat."
A jury in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma convicted
Viefhaus on all three charges," Viefhaus only appealed the conviction for use of
a telephone to make a bomb threat and the part of the conspiracy charge that related
to the bomb threat.
On appeal, Viethaus presented two issues of error relating to the constitutional
question. First, Viefhaus argued that the trial court erred in failing to address, as a
threshold matter, the First Amendment implications of prosecuting him for pure
speech." In his brief, Viefhaus cited Dennis v. United States," which stated,
"[W]hen facts are found that establish the violation of a statute, the protection
against conviction afforded by the First Amendment is a matter of law."'" The
92. Id.
93. Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392. 394 (10th Cir. 1999).
94. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Viejaus (No. 97-5207). The chemicals apparently belonged to
codefendant Howe, and were obtained by her during her work as an informant for the government.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (Supp. 1 2001). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, through use of the .. . telephone... willfully makes any threat... to kill,
injure, or intimidate any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any building,
vehicle, or other real or personal property by means of fire or an explosive shall be
sentenced for not more than ten years or fined under this title, or both.
Id.
96. Viejhaus, 168 F.3d at 395.
97. Id.
98. Brief for Appellant at 9, Viejhaus (No. 97-5207).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
100. Id. at 512.
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Tenth Circuit rejected this argument as inapplicable because Viefhaus did not
contest the constitutionality of the statute."' The court also cited Crews in its
determination that the issue of whether the speech was "political" was a question
for the jury."2 Accordingly, the court concluded that a jury must decide the issue
of whether the statements made fall into a category of unprotected speech. 3
In the second issue on appeal, Viefhaus asked the court to rule, as a matter of
law, that his speech was political and therefore protected speech, that did not
constitute a "true threat.""'' Citing Watts, Viefhaus specifically argued four
propositions: (1) the statements were made in a political context; (2) the statements
were expressly conditional; (3) the statements did not state that Viefhaus intended
to bomb anything; and (4) the message was not intended to convey a threat to
anyone."' Because the court had already determined that the jury must decide
whether the speech constituted a "true threat," the court did little to address this
issue. The court did define a "true threat" as "'a serious threat as distinguished from
words as mere political argument, idle talk or jest.""' Again, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the reasonable person standard from Welch."7 The court concluded that
a reasonable person could interpret Viefhaus's comments as a "true threat" and
declined to upset the finding of the jury."
Addressing the novel factual problem that Viefhaus himself did not make the
threat but only repeated the words of a "high ranking revolutionary commander,"
the court acknowledged the lack of case law on the issue."' The court, addressing
this issue of first impression, concluded that a reasonable person could infer that the
defendant had adopted the third party's intent to injure or kill as his own."'
Therefore, the defendant would still be guilty of violating the statute."' The Tenth
Circuit also found, without significant discussion, the conditionality of Viefhaus's
threat irrelevant because the contingency remained in Viefhaus's control."'
B. Where the Tenth Circuit Went Wrong
In deciding this case, the Tenth Circuit did not exhibit the concern for infringing
free speech rights that has characterized the opinions of the Supreme Court and
several other circuits. First, the court refused to consider the role of the court in
101. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396.
102. Id. at 397.
103. Id.
104. Brief for Appellant at 17, VieJhaus (No. 97-5207).
105. Id. at 19-20.
106. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 395 (quoting United States v. Leaverton, 835 F.2d 254, 257 (10th Cir.
1987)).
107. Id. at 396.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. ld. In United States v. Leaverton, the court explained that conditional language can negate a
threat, but not if the condition is within the control of the maker of the threat. United States v.
Leaverton, 835 F.2d 254, 256 (10th Cir. 1987).
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making a threshold inquiry of First Amendment implications. The court misread
Dennis as applying only to facial challenges to a statute, rather than also to the
application of that statute. Further, Watts demands that any interpretation of a
statute that punishes speech must be done "with the commands of the First
Amendment clearly in mind.""' To accomplish this, the Court suggested three
factors to determine the permissible scope of prosecution: context, conditionality,
and the reaction of the listeners. "4
The Tenth Circuit mentioned context and conditionality but then disregarded them
as irrelevant."5 The court failed to consider that both the context and the con-
ditionality of the language made the "threats" so unlikely as to be meaningless. The
objectionable language occurred at the end of a long political diatribe in which
Viefhaus attempted to sell bumper stickers and asked callers to leave comments." 6
This speech referred to an unknown party who had demanded some unspecified
conduct by unnamed "warriors" in order to prevent bombs in unidentified cities."7
The intended listeners of this speech would not likely take it as a serious threat, as
the recording did not even tell listeners what action they must take within the next
week to prevent the bombing."'
In addressing the Watts Court's reverence for First Amendment rights, the Kelner
court stated that the court must, as a threshold matter, determine that the threat is
within the constitutionally permissible scope of the statute."9 To accomplish this
inquiry, the court must determine that the threat is unequivocal, unconditional, and
a specific expression of an intent to inflict immediate injury." Additionally, to
bi constitutionally punishable, the threats must, according to their language and
context, convey a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution.''
The court in Viejhaus did not first make this inquiry and did not believe it was
the function of the court to make this inquiry. In effect, the court decided that if the
jury found that the statements fit into the proscription of the statute, the First
Amendment was not implicated.' Because constitutional questions must be
questions of law and not of fact,'" this decision enhances the role of the jury and
abrogates the duty of the court. By shirking its duty, the court allows the jury to
punish unpopular speech, without affording the defendant his constitutionally
protected freedoms. At trial, the prosecution presented reams of racist literature
taken from Viefhaus's apartment, literature that would highly offend most
113. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
114. Id. at 708.
115. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396.
116. Brief for Appellant at 3-5, Viefhaus (No. 95-5207); see also text accompanying note 91.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1028 (1976).
120. Id. at 1027.
121. Id. at 1026.
122. Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392, 396-97 (10th Cir. 1999).
123. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1028.
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people." Then the court allowed this inflamed jury to determine whether the
statements fell within the realm of First Amendment protection. This invasion of
the court's province presents manifest dangers. First Amendment guarantees intend
to prevent precisely this type of conviction. When the masses may determine what
qualifies as punishable speech, the nation's cherished protection of dissidence will
soon be lost.
The Viefhaus court also clung to the reasonable person standard in assessing
whether the evidence of a threat is sufficient to go to the jury. The Supreme Court
expressed its distaste for this standard in Watts, stating that it had "grave doubts
about it[s]" correctness."2 In Rogers, Justice Marshall further questioned the
validity of the reasonable person standard in determining whether a statement was
a "true threat."'" Marshall feared that such an expansive construction of threat
statutes would create a substantial risk of criminalizing crude, but still constitution-
ally protected, speech. 7 Marshall worried that the objective person test would, in
effect, apply a negligence standard to the criminal defendant and charge him with
liability merely for the reaction of his listeners."' This construction would do
great violence to the values underlying the First Amendment.
Despite the Supreme Court's blatant opposition to this standard, the Tenth Circuit
has consistently relied on the reasonable person standard since 1972. In United
States v. Hart,'29 the Tenth Circuit cited with approval the very case that the
Supreme Court expressed grave doubts about in Watts."' By using the reasonable
person standard, the Tenth Circuit exposes criminal defendants to a negligence
standard, which is inherently inconsistent with the "willful" requirement established
in the threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). Additionally, this standard conflicts with
the values of the First Amendment by allowing a jury to convict if it believes a
reasonable person would see the statement as a threat. This standard simply
compounds the problems created by relegating the constitutional questions to the
jury for determination as discussed above.
Adding to the problems of this decision, the court glossed over two facts that take
VieJhaus outside the fact pattern of the typical threat case. First, Viefhaus did not
communicate the "threat" to its intended victim. Had the defendant called in bomb
threats to buildings in "fifteen preselected cities," this case would have presented
few difficulties. Viefhaus, however, did not call anyone at all. He left a recording
on an answering machine. The VieJhaus court, in a single sentence, dismissed this
argument stating that the statute did not mandate that the defendant initiate the
call."' The Kelner court, however, insisted that the similarly worded 18 U.S.C.
124. Id. at 397.
125. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
126. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 42-48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 44.
128. ld at 47.
129. 457 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1972).
130. Id; see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (asserting that the rationale of Ragansky v. United
States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918) was questionable).
131. Viefhaus v. United States, 168 F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999).
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§ 875(c) required that the defendant have a specific intent to communicate his threat
to the victim, Yasser Arafat." Without this requirement, one could be prosecuted
for merely talking on the phone with a friend and stating a desire to blow up a
building. While this is not desirable conduct, it is certainly conduct protected by the
First Amendment. Additionally, it comes dangerously close to prosecuting mens
real" alone, without requiring any overt act. Further, this type of prosecution has
been expressly rejected in a long line of Supreme Court cases condemning the
punishment of advocacy of violence in order to reach a desirable end."u
Second, the court only briefly considered the fact that Viefhaus himself did not
originate the threats.'35  The recorded message stated that "a high ranking
revolutionary commander" had threatened to set off bombs if his fellow white
warriors did not act against the government." s This statement apparently
referenced a letter by another white supremacist, Willie Ray Lampley.' Viefhaus
did not make the threat and did not control its being carried out. The Viefhaus case.
makes it permissible t6punish one who repeats a threat originally made by another.
Once again, the public must carefully watch anything it says over the telephone
to a friend for fear that they might be prosecuted for repeating threats made by
others. The court stated that a reasonable person could infer that Viefhaus adopted
the statement as his own, yet it cited no authority for this proposition, nor did it
explain what evidence could support this inference." This inference by the court
runs precisely afoul of a hypothetical raised in United States v. Alkhabaz,'39
whereby an attendant of the trial repeats the threat made by the defendant and is
therefore prosecuted. " In that case, the court concluded that the purpose of anti-
threat statutes was to prevent the intended recipient from being intimidated or
having his peace of mind disturbed."' In the instant case, Viefhaus did not make
the threat, nor did he intend to intimidate his callers. Typical callers of the "Aryan
Intelligence Network" would expect to hear just such rhetoric.
While Viefhaus's message would certainly offend most Americans, the First
Amendment still protects it. In the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, no jury
in the state would have acquitted Viefhaus. For this very reason, the court failed by
not addressing the constitutional question before passing it on to the jury.
132. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1976).
133. Mens tea is a guilty mind or criminal intent. BLACK's LAw DIcTrONARY 1137 (4th ed. 1968).
134. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the State may not punish
advocacy of violence unless that advocacy incites imminent lawless action); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961) (holding that abstract teaching of propriety of violence is not punishable); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (holding that advocacy, unrelated to its tendency to produce forcible
action, is protected by the First Amendment).
135. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396.
136. Id. at 394.
137. David Harper, Tulsan's Case Raises Questions at Appellate Level, TuLSA WORLD, Jan. 23,
1999 at 9, available at 1999 WL 5388193.
138. Viejhaus, 168 F.3d at 396.
139. 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
140. Id. at 1496.
141. Id.
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Unpopular speech is the very type of speech that the First Amendment most
zealously protects. The Supreme Court addressed a similar type of speech in
Claiborne, except there, the defendant was a black man who believed that action
must be taken immediately to stop the oppression of his race.44 The defendant
made threats to break the necks of those who did not unite in action against their
oppressors."4 The Supreme Court ratified this speech and ruled that the First
Amendment protected it." Justice Stevens asserted that an advocate "must be free
to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity in a
common cause," even if that includes threats and intimidation.45 Few would like
to equate the speeches of Charles Evers and other civil rights leaders with the
rantings of white supremacists. The content of the speeches, however, is quite
similar; only the righteousness of the cause differs.
V. A More Reasoned Approach to "True Threats"
Federal courts deciding cases involving anti-threat statutes have received little
guidance from the Supreme Court since Watts. Federal courts have not relied on the
reasoning of Claiborne to decide threat cases, probably because Claiborne was a
civil case and did not interpret an anti-threat statute. However, the Court decided
Brandenburg v. Ohio in the same term as it decided Watts. Brandenburg has since
come to memorialize the triumph of civil libertarianism in free speech jurisprudence.
State and federal courts and the Supreme Court itself have cited Brandenburg
thousands of times as absolutely prohibiting the punishment of advocacy of violence
unless that advocacy is directed to incitement of imminent lawless action.'" While
the scope and influence of Brandenburg's speech-protective pronouncements has
grown, the significance of Watts has declined. While certainly cited in every
opinion involving a threat statute, courts have not attached the same reverence for
Brandenburg protection of threats as they have to its protection of advocacy of
violence.47 Because the Supreme Court has not offered additional guidance on the
142. NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).
143. Id. at 902.
144. Id. at 928.
145. flt
146, See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108
(1973); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F. 2d 1017, 1023(5th Cir. 1987); McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Tolia, 631 N.Y.S.2d 632, 637 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995).
147. Unlike threat cases, in incitement cases, courts invariably make a threshold finding as to
whether the speech is outside the protection of the Fast Amendment before passing it on to the jury. See,
e.g., Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1021 (stating that courts are not free to accept the jury's mixed finding of fact
and law and must independently determine whether the speech falls within the unprotected category to
sufficiently confine the parameters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an
effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited); see also Frederick Schauer, The Role of
the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. RaV. 761, 766 (1986) (noting that questions of
imminence and likelihood in the application of Brandenburg are not left even to properly instructed
juries, but remain subject to judicial scrutiny).
[Vol. 54:397
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss2/6
NOTES
"true threat" doctrine, the federal courts are likely to continue offering scant
protection to language that could be perceived as a threat.
Even if one believes that James Viefhaus should be imprisoned for his utterances,
one can hardly deny that the court's reasoning poses constitutional difficulties for
the future.'" Until the Supreme Court agrees to review one of these cases, the
circuit courts are likely to continue searching for answers in threat cases. In order
to restore the First Amendment to its rightful stature, the courts should consider four
factors when deciding a case involving threatening speech.
First, courts should insist on making a threshold finding that the speech is beyond
the pale of First Amendment protection before passing it on to the jury. The
constitutional question should be squarely within the domain of the judge, as a
question of law. By first determining that the threat expresses an unequivocal,
unconditional, and immediate threat of harm, the court ensures that the statute is
applied in a manner that is consistent with the First Amendment. If, by contrast, the
jury makes this decision, the public, rather than the Constitution, effectively
determines what speech should be protected. The Bill of Rights exists to keep the
whims of the majority from punishing dissidence. If this practice had occurred in
other areas, abolitionists, women's suffragettes, and war protestors would surely
have been punished in even greater numbers. In light of increasing domestic
terrorism, courts have an even greater pressure to ensure that the populace, seeking
greater security from political dissidents, does not trample First Amendment rights.
Second, the "reasonable person," or objective standard, must go by the wayside.
The fate of a defendant in a threat case should not rest on whether a reasonable
person would construe the statement as a threat. This does not work in other areas
of criminal law, 9 and should not be allowed when free speech rights are at stake.
Instead, courts should adopt a subjective test to determine whether a threat falls
within the statute. While difficulties arise in determining what a defendant
subjectively intended, the standard has worked well in other areas of criminal law.
If the defendant intended the victim of his threat to perceive the statement as a
threat, the prosecution encounters no problems. This intent can be proven by
circumstantial evidence as it is in other criminal cases. In an area as sensitive as the
First Amendment, courts must not allow a standard as weak as the reasonable
person standard to determine the fate of defendants.
Third, the courts must read anti-threat statutes literally regarding intent to
communicate a threat. In cases such as Crews, the defendant expressed his desire
to shoot the President to his psychiatric nurse.' This threat had little chance of
reaching its intended victim or of disturbing the victim's peace of mind. At the very
least, a "true threat" must be intended to threaten. It is not legally sound to
criminally prosecute people who make implausible outbursts. The Bible may speak
148. It should be noted that Viefhaus would have served exactly the same amount of time for the
possession charge as he did for all of the charges combined, as the sentences were to run concurrently.
149. See supra notes 75, 125-28 and accompanying text.
150. United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1986).
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of God punishing for lust in the heart,' but American criminal law punishes only
evil acts, not merely evil thoughts.
Finally, the courts should be especially cautious when the prosecuted speech is
political in nature. While the First Amendment clearly protects more than just
political dialogue, the bedrock of free speech is the desire to promote open political
discussion. The Supreme Court has expressed the reverence with which political
speech must be treated in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,' Texas v. Johnson,
53
Buckley v. Valeo,'" Roth v. United States, ' and numerous other opinions. This
country was founded by political dissidents who not only threatened to overthrow
the government, but succeeded in doing so. While one shudders to think of white
supremacists like James Viefhaus taking over the country, precedent like Viefhaus
results in suppression of even the most laudable dissidents.
V. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit has clearly encroached on the arena of protected speech as
outlined by the Supreme Court. Watts and Claiborne reaffirmed the Court's
commitment to preserving inviolate, uninhibited, and robust expression. By
affirming the conviction of James Viefhaus, the Tenth Circuit endangered the right
of citizens to express their opinions, especially unpopular ones. In the wake of the
bombing of the Murrah building in Oklahoma City, courts will likely find
themselves inclined to follow Viefhaus in order to prevent another such catastrophe.
The nation has often struggled to find the proper balance between freedom and
security, which may present the most difficult task in a constitutional republic. But
when wading between Scylla and Charybdis, the courts should always err on the
side of more freedom. The nation's history, replete with instances of choosing
security over freedom, reveals the abysmal results of this choice. The Supreme
Court, in the Warren era, finally righted this balance with the triumph of the civil
libertarian philosophy toward free speech rights. The United States maintains its
unique position in this world because it not only tolerates, but welcomes dissenters
and malcontents. James Viefhaus was nothing but a vocal malcontent with fragile
self-esteem and a hateful message. We need not agree with what he believes, but
should defend his right to say it.
Stephanie D. Wade
151. Matthew 5:28.
152. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991).
153. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989).
154. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
155. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 478, 484 (1957).
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